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INTRODUCTION

Higher education is extremely expensive. There are a variety of tax rules
designed to make it (somewhat) more affordable. The tax benefits for higher
education come in a variety of forms: credits, deductions, and exclusions.'
Some of these tax items reduce income tax liability; others reduce gift tax
liability (which in turn may decrease estate tax liability). Determining one's
eligibility for different educational tax benefits can be a complex and
confusing task. 2 For the most part, the highly detailed rules that apply in
determining a taxpayer's eligibility for one particular benefit do not apply to
other benefits. For example, a taxpayer who is eligible for a refundable
education tax credit may be ineligible for a non-refundable education tax
credit under the same Internal Revenue Code provision; a taxpayer who is
eligible for a deduction due to a particular tuition payment under one Code
section may not be eligible for a similar income exclusion on college savings
under another Code section; and so on.3
For those who value higher education, it seems difficult to argue that
Congress should not provide tax benefits to students. After all, college
graduates tend to have higher average incomes and better health than the
general population.4 Societies with more college graduates typically have
1.
See, e.g., infra Part III (discussing selected income and wealth transfer tax benefits
for higher education).
2.
See, e.g., JOE VALENTI, DAVID BERGERON & ELIZABETH BAYLOR, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, HARNESSING THE TAX CODE TO PROMOTE COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY 4 (2014),

https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/HigherEdTaxBens-briefl .pdf
[https://perna.cc/7NBX-7NE8] ("[S]tudents' and parents' current tax choices such as the
availability of two different tax credits and a deduction for expenses while in school, each with
their own eligibility criteria needlessly confuse families and complicate the tax system.").
3. See, e.g., infra Section III.A (discussing income tax limitations on taxpayers eligible
for certain credits, deductions, and exclusions).
4.
See Philip Oreopoulos & Uros Petronijevic, Making College Worth It: A Review of
the Returns to HigherEducation,FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring 2013, at 41, 45-46, 55 (providing
data on average annual earnings in 2010 by occupation and education and showing that those
with bachelor's degrees earn more than those with high school degrees). Higher education "is
associated with higher labor market earnings across all major occupation sectors[,]" in addition
to other economic benefits. Id. at 47 fig.2; see also ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE, STEPHEN J. ROSE
& BAN CHEAH, CTR. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, GEORGETOWN UNIV., THE COLLEGE
PAYOFF: EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS, LIFETIME EARNINGS 3-4 (2011), https://files.eric.ed.gov

/fulltext/ED524299.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2QV-K8AT] ("Bachelor's degree holders earn 31
percent more than workers with an Associate's degree and 74 percent more than those with just
a high school diploma."); DIANE WHITMORE SCHANZENBACH, LAUREN BAUER & AUDREY
BREITWIESER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, EIGHT ECONOMIC FACTS ON HIGHER EDUCATION, at

i (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/thp 20170426_eightecono
mic_factshigher education.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3CV-3HBB] ("Higher education provides
extensive benefits to students, including higher wages, better health, and a lower likelihood of
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lower levels of poverty5 and increased rates of civic engagement. 6 Higher
education benefits both individuals and society.7 Indeed, there is a good case
to be made for additional tax benefits to address higher education student
debt."
In evaluating tax expenditures for higher education, or indeed any tax law,
it is important to understand how the law impacts particular groups or
classifications of taxpayers. Standard economic and legal analyses typically
invoke efficiency, equity, and administrability as the primary criteria for
evaluating any tax rule.' "Equity," according to the conventional
requiring disability payments."). In addition to economic benefits, "Americans with a college
education report they are happier, healthier and enjoying a higher quality of life than respondents
with a high school education or less." Michael T. Nietzel, New Evidence for the BroadBenefits
ofHigher Education, FORBES (June 17, 2019, 6:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michael
tnietzel/2019/06/17/new-evidence-for-the-broad-benefits-of-higher-education/
[https://perma.
cc/E8AE-ATAK] (relying on data from the 2018 General Social Survey); see also NAT'L CTR.
FOR HEALTH

STAT., U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED

STATES,

2011,

at 30 fig.25, 37 fig.32 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus 11.pdf [https://penna.cc/
52FC-ZHRY] (showing lower rates of obesity in families where the head of household has a
bachelor's degree or higher and finding that those with a bachelor's degree also have greater life
expectancies).
5.
See, e.g., WALTER W. MCMAHON, HIGHER LEARNING, GREATER GOOD: THE
PRIVATE AND SOCIAL BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 18-19 (2009) ("The social benefits [of

higher education] include contributions beyond income by higher education to the operation of
civic institutions essential to democracy, human rights, and political stability, as well as
contributions to the operation of the criminal justice system, to crime reduction, to poverty
reduction, to environmental sustainability, and to the creation and dissemination of new
knowledge.").
6.
See, e.g., Andrew J. Perrin & Alanna Gillis, How College Makes Citizens: Higher
Education Experiences and PoliticalEngagement, SOCKUS, Jan.-Dec. 2019, at 1, 1 (noting the
positive correlation between political participation and higher education); D. Sunshine Hillygus,
The Missing Link: Exploring the Relationship Between Higher Education and Political
Engagement, 27 POL. BEHAV. 25, 26 (2005) (explaining the increased political engagement by
college graduates as a function of "the verbal skills students bring to college and the curriculum
studied while there").
7.
See, e.g., SANDY BAUM & KATHLEEN PAYEA, COLL. BD., EDUCATION PAYS 2004:
THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 10, 23-24 (rev. ed.

2005), https://research.collegeboard.org/pdf/education-pays-2004-full-report.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/KTZ4-DWEC] (detailing societal benefits based on postsecondary education, such as
higher income tax payments and increased rates, for example, of voting and blood donation).
8.
See Bridget J. Crawford, Shamik Trivedi & Kimberly Bliss, Educational Tax
Benefits: More Please, 129 TAx NOTES 1323, 1323 (2010) (arguing that "[t]he government can
and should do more to ease the debt burden associated with higher education").
9.
These principles derive generally from the work of eighteenth-century economist
Adam Smith. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH

OF NATIONS 825-27 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776) (presenting the
"four maxims" of taxation: the revenue function of taxes, the equity imperative for tax laws, the
convenience to administer and pay under any tax system, and the requirement that tax systems
refrain from undue interference with economic markets). In teaching an introductory taxation
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understanding, is the notion that income-equivalent taxpayers should be taxed
similarly.1 0 In contrast, for critical tax scholars, a more expansive approach to
"equity" drives the inquiry." Critical tax theorists ask how tax laws impact
taxpayers differently along the lines of race, gender, class, disability,
sexuality, and a variety of other identity axes.1 2 Questions of race took on
greater urgency for many Americans in the summer of 2020, after a white
police officer killed George Floyd, an unarmed Black man, by kneeling for
nine minutes and twenty-nine seconds on Floyd's neck; video shot by a
bystander was widely distributed on social media and in the press.13 With
massive public demonstrations in the weeks following Floyd's death,1 4 race
became salient in a new way for many whites." Critical tax scholarship can
illuminate how tax laws are deeply implicated in racial inequalities and fail to
operate in race-neutral ways.

Primarily, critical tax analysis relies on official data published by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). For example, because some tax benefits are

course, Professor Anthony Infanti explains the goals in more contemporary terms: "[W]e should
strive for a tax system that (1) minimizes interference with economic decisionnaking, (2) is fair,
and (3) is easy to administer and comply with . . balancing [] important policy considerations
that have a real, everyday impact on all of our lives." Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Eq#4y, 55 BUFF.

L. REv. 1191, 1192 (2008).
10. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191, 191
(1992). Not all scholars agree, however, that horizontal equity should be a driving principle of
tax policy. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage ofEquivalence andthe EtherealPrinciplesof
ParallelismandHorizontalEquity, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 652 (2005) ("[M]any persons do give
weight to horizontal equity, and even those who do not frown on unequal treatment of the same
item.").
11. See Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to CRITICAL TAX
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, at xxi (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2009)
("When viewed as a whole, it becomes clear that all critical tax scholarship shares one or more
of the following goals: (1) to uncover bias in the tax laws; (2) to explore and expose how the tax
laws both reflect and construct social meaning; and (3) to educate nontax scholars and lawyers
about the interconnectedness of taxation, social justice, and progressive political movements.").
12. See id. at xxii.
13. Eric Levenson, Former Officer Knelt on George Floyd for 9 Minutes and 29
Seconds- Not the Infamous 8:46, CNN (Mar. 30, 2021, 6:27 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021
/03/29/us/george-floyd-timing-929-846/index.html [https://perma.cc/TRD8-KNVV]; What We
Know About the Death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/48KG-SMY6].
14. See, e.g., Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May
Be the LargestMovement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2ZqRyOU
[https://perma.cc/9PVN-ZWFW] (reporting that demonstrations inthe weeks afterFloyd's death
drew between 15 million and 26 million people in the United States, making this "the largest
movement in the country's history").
15. See, e.g., Amy Harmon & Audra D.S. Burch, White Americans Say They Are Waking
Up to Racism. What Will It Add Up To?, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2YoV25f
[https://perma.cc/3LF4-FRJF] ("It is as though the ability of white people to collectively ignore
the everyday experience of black people has been short-circuited, at least for now.").
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contingent on age or disability, it is possible for researchers to ascertain easily
the number of taxpayers who claim certain benefits.1 6 To a limited extent, data
about gender exist as well, but in the income tax context, the data are largely
limited to wage-based information.' 7 The IRS reports some gift and estate tax
data by gender.18 Because income, gift, and estate tax returns do not ask about
the taxpayer's gender, though, the agency must match tax data with social
security data for gender-based reporting.1 9 The IRS does not collect
information about race or ethnicity, and the agency maintains an official
"colorblind" approach to reporting all tax data. 2 Thus, race and ethnicity are
uniquely difficult to research by reference to the IRS's information.
Without official tax data compiled on the basis of race, researchers have
turned to other sources to reveal an enormous racial economic inequality in

16. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 22(a)-(b), (c)(2)(A)(ii) (providing a credit of up to $7,500 for
spouses filing jointly who both qualify by either attaining the age of sixty-five or retiring on
disability and being permanently and totally disabled); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 1304,
STATISTICS OF INCOME: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS COMPLETE REPORT 2018, at 52

tbl.1.3 (rev. Sept. 2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1304.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3Z5XAVC] (estimating over 56,000 returns claiming credits for the elderly or disabled in the
aggregate amount of approximately $4.8 million).
17.

See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA ON SALARIES AND WAGES AND

BUSINESS INCOME, BY GENDER, TAX YEAR 2009, at tbl.1 (2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/09in0lgender.pdf [https://penna.cc/YM8X-2PN3] (reporting differences in income between

men

and women); EMMANUEL SAEZ, STATISTICS OF INCOME TABULATIONS: HIGH INCOMES,
GENDER, AGE, EARNINGS SPLIT, AND NON-FILERS 4 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-

soi/16rpsaeztabulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7KV-JD5D] (reporting wage income based on
gender).
18.

See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 5368, STATISTICS OF INCOME, 2017

GIFTS (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5368.pdf
[https://penna.cc/JG4X-43PS]
(reporting the amount of gifts given by gender, transfer method, and tax status); Martha Britton
Eller, CharitableBequests: Evidence from FederalEstate Tax Returns, STAT. INCOME BULL.,
Spring 2001, at 174, 178 fig.F (showing charitable bequests by sex of the donor).
19.

See Form 706: United States Estate (andGeneration-SkippingTransfer) Tax Return,

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (rev. Aug. 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f706.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LT4-Z3CK]; Form 709: United States Gift (and Generation-Skipping
Transfer) Tax Return, INTERNAL

REVENUE

SERV.

(2020),

https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-

access/f709_accessible.pdf [https://penna.cc/D83D-W6LD].
20. See, e.g., Form 1040: U.S. IndividualIncome Tax Return, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.
(2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf [https://penna.cc/R7MP-9Y8X] (lacking any
questions about race or ethnicity of taxpayers). See generally Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Should the
IRS Know Your Race? The Challenge of ColorblindTax Data, 73 TAX L. REV. 1, 6-37 (2019)
(discussing past and current "colorblind" practices of the IRS). As Professor Bearer-Friend
demonstrates, scholars make estimates of tax provisions' race-based differential impacts by
using data from sources, such as the Current Population Survey, the Survey of Income and
Program Participation, and the National Survey of Families and Households. Id. at 40-41, 41

tbl.1.
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the United States. 2' According to the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, for
example, median family net worth was $121,700 for white, non-Hispanics;
$18,200 for Black or African-Americans; $21,900 for Hispanics or Latinos;

and $68,800 for families of "other" or multiple races. 22 Deeply implicated in
racial economic inequality are disparities in education by race. According to
data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the percentage of individuals twenty-five
and older with a bachelor's degree or higher is 40.2% among non-Hispanic
whites, 26.1% among Blacks, 58.1% among Asians, and 18.8% among
Hispanics of any race. 23

Race and ethnicity have always played a role in the history of education
in the United States. For example, many states criminalized teaching both
slaves and free "persons of colour" to read or write. 24 The continued exclusion
of Blacks from institutions of higher learning even after the enactment of the
Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 was the impetus for the establishment of

21. See, e.g., Median Usual Weekly Earnings ofFull-time Wage andSalary Workers by
Race and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB.
STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/charts/usual-weekly-earnings/usual-weekly-earnings-over-time-by-race.
him [https://perma.cc/7D8D-TPRG] (reporting data for years 2000 to 2020); Neil Bhutta, Jesse
Bricker, Andrew C. Chang, Lisa J. Dettling, Sarena Goodman, Joanne W. Hsu, Kevin B. Moore,
Sarah Reber, Alice Henriques Volz & Richard A. Windle, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Changes in US. Family Financesfrom 2016 to 2019: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer

Finances, FED. RSRV. BULL., Sept. 2020, at 1, 11 (relying on the Federal Reserve's Survey of
Consumer Finances to determine wealth inequality by race for years 2016 and 2019); Beverly I.
Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the InternalRevenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV.
751 app. at 816-17 (drawing on information from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation, among other sources); Dorothy A. Brown, The MarriageBonus/Penaltyin Black
and White, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 787, 792 (1997) [hereinafter Brown, Marriage Bonus/Penalty]
(pulling data from the Census Bureau, among other sources); Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax
Treatment of Children: Separate But Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755, 757 (2005) [hereinafter
Brown, Tax Treatment of Children] (drawing on data from the Current Population Survey).
22. Bhutta et al., supra note 21, at 38 (explaining that, in the Survey of Consumer
Finances, "[t]he 'other or multiple race' classification consists of respondents identifying as
Asian, American Indian, Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, other race, and all
respondents reporting more than one racial identification"). Approximately 80% of the members
of this "other or multiple race" surveyed group identified as Asian. See RAY BOSHARA,
WILLIAM R. EMMONS & BRYAN J. NOETH, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, THE
DEMOGRAPHICS OF WEALTH: How AGE, EDUCATION AND RACE SEPARATE THRIVERS FROM
STRUGGLERS IN TODAY'S ECONOMY 5 (2015), https://www.stlouisfed.org/-/media/files/pdfs/

hfs/essays/hfs-essay-1-2015-race-ethnicity-and-wealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTJ4-Q822].
23. See EducationalAttainment in the United States: 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan.
4, 2021), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2019/demo/educational-attainment/cps-detailedtables.html [https://perma.cc/T8YT-TYPL] (choose "Table 3" hyperlink).
24. See, e.g., Marvin H. Lett, Grutter, Gratz, and Affirmative Action: Why No Original
Thought?, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 417, 432-37 (2005) (summarizing antebellum laws in North
Carolina and Louisiana along with the continued denial of education to Blacks after passage of
Thirteenth Amendment).
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historically Black colleges and universities. 25 Although the U.S. Supreme
Court declared racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional in Brown
v. Board of Education in 1954,26 the University of Mississippi did not enroll

its first Black student until 1962.27 Also well into the twentieth century, many
private colleges, including Ivy League schools, imposed informal or formal
quotas on the number of Jewish students they enrolled. 28 Now in the twentyfirst century, some groups argue that elite colleges impose illegal quotas on

the number of Asian-American students they admit. 29 On the other side of the
college admissions spectrum, at many schools, legacy applicants-who are

25. See, e.g., Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Higher Education
Desegregation,U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Mar. 1991), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/hq9511.html [https://perna.cc/KG4P-HVRL] ("Prior to the time of [the] establishment [of
historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs)], and for many years afterwards, [B]lacks
were generally denied admission to traditionally white institutions. As a result, HBCUs became
the principle [sic] means for providing postsecondary education to black Americans.").
Historically Black colleges and universities are statutorily defined as "any historically Black
college or university that was established prior to 1964, whose principal mission was, and is, the
education of Black Americans, and that is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting
agency or association determined by the Secretary [of Education]." 20 U.S.C. § 1061(2).
26. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal").
27. See Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1962) (requiring the University
of Mississippi to admit its first Black student). See generallyDenny Chin & Kathy Hirata Chin,
Constance Baker Motley, James Meredith, and the University of Mississippi, 117 COLUM. L.
REv. 1741 (2017) (examining in detail the case by the NAACP's Legal Defense and Education
Fund on behalf of James Meredith, which resulted in the University of Mississippi's
desegregation).
28. See, e.g., Stephen Steinberg, How Jewish Quotas Began, COMMENT. MAG. (Sept. 1,
1971), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/how -jewish-quotas-began/ [https://per
ma.cc/HNS4-YM7F] (describing the history of quotas for Jewish students at several schools,
with a particular focus on Harvard University).
29. See, e.g., Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,
397. F. Supp. 3d 126, 197 (D. Mass. 2019) (finding Harvard did not use impermissible fixed
quotas to discriminate against Asian-American students). This holding was recently affirmed.
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 980 F.3d 157, 20304 (1st Cir. 2020). The Department of Justice dropped a Trump-era challenge to Yale
University's admission policies as allegedly discriminatory against both Asian-American and
white applicants. See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, JusticeDepartmentSues Yale OverAdmissions, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Oct. 12, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/202
0/10/12/justice-department-sues-yale-over-admissions
[https://perma.cc/9HWR-PM64]
("Yale's policies favor Black and Latinx applicants, the suit alleges."); Anemona Hartocollis,
Justice Department Drops Suit Claiming Yale Discriminatedin Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
3, 2021), hups://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/03/us/yale-admissions-affirmative-action.html?
smid=url-share [https://perma.cc/2Z3X-UTDN] ("The Justice Department on Wednesday
withdrew a lawsuit against Yale University that charged it with discriminating against AsianAmerican and white applicants, reversing a key element of the Trump administration's efforts
to undermine race-based college admissions.").
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children of alumni-receive admission preferences. 30 At most schools, the
pool of legacy applicants is disproportionately white compared to the general

application pool at the same school. 31 This is because most schools' alumni
bases are largely white; over time, the legacy pool may (or may not) come to
reflect the demographics of a school's more recent graduating classes.3 2 In
these many ways, issues of race and higher education have always been
intertwined.
This Article combines three topics-taxes, higher education, and raceto evaluate the tax system's role in exacerbating racial inequalities. Part II
frames the discussion with a brief overview of the economics of higher
education: how much it costs, how much debt the average student incurs to
afford it, and how that debt burden varies by race. Part III describes the major
income and wealth transfer tax benefits for higher education, including I.R.C.

§ 2503(e)'s exclusion of direct tuition payments from gift tax. Part IV
demonstrates how this gift tax exclusion disproportionately benefits white
families already more likely to avail themselves of other generous tax benefits
for higher education while also noting that the exclusion is inconsistent with
the overall purpose of wealth transfer taxes. Additionally, Part IV argues that
I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A)'s exclusion is inequitable and should be repealed
because it exacerbates the racial wealth gap and creates lifetime benefits for
the donee while diminishing the donor's tax base. Part V evaluates
opportunities for future research at the intersection of race and tax benefits for
30. See Steve D. Shadowen, Sozi P. Tulante & Sham L. Alpern, No DistinctionsExcept
Those Which Merit Originates:The Unlawfulness ofLegacy Preferencesin Public and Private
Universities, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 51, 129 (2009) (finding that 102 out of the top 150
schools, as ranked by U.S. News in 2007, maintained a legacy preference for applicants). The
"value" of legacy status can depend on the school. See, e.g., id. at 58 (comparing the admission
rate for legacy applicants at the University of Virginia with a midwestem land-grant university);
The Crimson Staff, A Losing Legacy, THE HARV. CRIMSON (May 28, 2015),
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2015/5/28/staff-losing-legacy-admissions/ [https://perma.
cc/78BY-KLHF] (reporting that students with at least one parent who attended Harvard College
are nearly three times as likely to be admitted to Harvard). Schools that have ended their legacy
preferences in recent years include Johns Hopkins University; the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; California Institute of Technology; and the University of California, Berkeley. See
Jill Robbins, Major UniversitiesEnding Legacy Admissions, VOA: LEARNING ENG. (Jan. 21,
2020), https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/major-universities-ending-legacy-admissions/
5249873.html [https://perma.cc/NRN2-3KKR].
31. See, e.g., Ginger O'Donnell, Challenging Legacy Admissions, INSIGHT INTO
DIVERSITY (June 27, 2018), https://www.insightintodiversity.com/challenging-legacyadmissions [https://perma.cc/VUY8-ZD8N] ("[U]nderrepresented minorities comprise 12.5
percent of applicants to elite colleges and universities but only 6.7 percent of legacy
applicants.").
32. See, e.g., Cameron Howell & Sarah E. Turner, Legacies in Black and White: The
Racial Composition of the Legacy Pool, 45 RSCH. HIGHER EDUC. 325, 343 (2004) (using the
University of Virginia as a case study to predict that it takes approximately twenty-five years
for a school's pool of legacy applicants to reflect the demographics of graduating classes).
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higher education and beyond. Part VI concludes with a call for an expanded
definition of "fairness" when evaluating the tax system.
II.

HIGHER EDUCATION COSTS

A.

Tuition and Fees

According to data provided by College Board, the average cost of college
tuition at public four-year universities during the 2019-2020 academic year
was $10,486 for in-state students and $15,873 for out-of-state students. 33 At
private schools, the average tuition was $36,880 for the same period. 34 These

are tuition prices only; the figures do not include the cost of room, board,
transportation, or other fees. These costs average $11,510 for a public fouryear institution and $12,610 for a private four-year institution. 35 At elite
institutions, the figures can be even higher: for the 2019-2020 academic year,
tuition at Yale University was $55,500, with room and board adding an
additional $16,600 to the bill. 36 Tuition at Harvard University for the same
period was $47,730; room and board cost $17,682.37

Admittedly, at both public and private institutions, not all students pay
full "sticker price" for their education. At Yale, more than 50% of
undergraduates receive need-based aid with an average scholarship of
approximately $52,800.38 At Harvard, approximately 55% of all students

receive need-based scholarship aid with an average award of $53,000.39
Across the United States, "[a]t private, nonprofit four-year colleges . . 89
percent of students receive some form of financial aid, meaning that almost
no one is paying full price." 40 The average gift-aid package is approximately
$9,520 (exclusive of wages from work-study programs). 4 1 Even so, many

33.

Liz Knueven, The Average College Tuition Keeps Rising, and It's Just the Start of

College Costs, BUS. INSIDER (July 14, 2020, 5:21 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/person
al-finance/average-college-tuition#annual-average-tuition-at-public-4-year-colleges-and-unive
rsities [https://penna.cc/HR4V-EJZK] (basing estimates on data from College Board).
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Abigail JohnsonHess, It Costs Almost $76,000 a Year to Go to Yale-But Here'sHow
Much Students Actually Pay, CNBC: MAKE IT (Apr. 20, 2019, 10:00 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/18/it-costs-75 925-to-go-to-yaleheres-how-much-students-actu
ally-pay.html [https://penna.cc/3T4D-ZN23].
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Paul Tough, What College Admissions Offices Really Want, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept.
10, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2wF5H0e [https://perma.cc/2LRP-5MKC].
41. Knueven, supra note 33 (providing aid figures for 2018-2019 academic year).
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substantially borrow to fund higher education

expenses. 42
B.

Student Debt and Loan Repayment

Students and families who do not receive scholarships or grants to fully
cover the cost of college attendance typically work and take out loans to

finance their futures. 43 In 2019, an estimated 62% of seniors graduating from

public and nonprofit colleges had some student debt; the average student had
$28,950 in loans. 44 However, that debt is not distributed equally among all

students. Black students graduating with bachelor's degrees are more likely
to have debt (and to have more of it) than their white, Hispanic/Latinx, or
Asian counterparts. 45 Eighty-five percent of all Black students had student
loan debt, compared to 69% of whites, 66% of Hispanic/Latinxs, and 45% of
Asians. 46 The average Black graduate had $34,000 in debt, an amount greater

than the average student debt of graduates who are white ($30,100),
Hispanic/Latinx ($25,450), or Asian ($25,450).47
Upon graduation, there are discernible racial differences in employment
outcomes as well. In 2019, the overall unemployment rate for all college
graduates was 5.1% with rates that varied by race: 7.7% for Asian
American/Pacific Islanders, 6.8% for Blacks, 6.4% for Hispanics, and 4.2%

for whites. 48 For those who were employed, average hourly wages also
differed by race: $22.97 for Asian American/Pacific Islanders, $20.57 for
whites, $19.39 for Hispanics, and $18.07 for Blacks. 49 These wage gaps can

42. See id. ("About 58% of all [bachelor's] degree recipients in 2018 graduated with some
student loan debt, with the average borrower owing $29,000.").
43. See J. OLIVER SCHAK, NANCY WONG, ANA FUNG & LINDSAY AHLMAN, THE INST.
FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, STUDENT DEBT AND THE CLASS OF 2019, at 28 (2020)

[hereinafter TICAS, 2019 STUDENT DEBT], https://ticas.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/class
of2019.pdf [https://perina.cc/V89Z-9C9A].
44. Id. at 5.
45.

See THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, QUICK FACTS ABOUT STUDENT DEBT

(2019), https://ticas.org/files/pub files/qf aboutstudentdebt.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DB5 -5CZ
8] [hereinafter TICAS, 2019 QUICK FACTS].
46. See id. (providing statistics for the class of 2016).
47. See id. The Brookings Institute has found that four years after graduation, Black
graduates have almost twice as much debt as white graduates. See Judith Scott-Clayton & Jing
Li, Black-White Disparity in Student Loan Debt More Than Triples After Graduation,
BROOKINGS INST., Oct. 20, 2016, at 1, 2-3. Researchers attribute the debt gap to differences in
additional borrowing for graduate school and loan interest rates. See id. at 4.
48.

See ELISE GOULD, ZANE MOKHIBER & JULIA WOLFE, ECON. POL'Y INST., CLASS OF

2019: COLLEGE EDITION 12, 14 fig.F (2019), https://www.epi.org/publication/class-of-2019college-edition/ [https://perna.cc/4TS4-DGH2] (showing unemployment rates for college
graduates ages twenty-one to twenty-four by gender and race/ethnicity).
49. See id. at 19 fig.I.
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be explained in part by occupational segregation, 50 but discrimination likely
plays a role as well."
Given that Black college graduates have the highest average debt load,5 2
the highest rates of unemployment, 53 and the lowest average wages,54 it is
unsurprising they have the greatest difficulty repaying student loans. For
graduates of four-year colleges, the default rate on student loans is relatively
low-around

5%.55 However, in the year following graduation, many

borrowers miss payments or apply for deferments or forbearances on loans
because of financial difficulty in making loan payments. 56 Among 2016
graduates for example, 40% of Black borrowers missed payments or sought a
deferment or forbearance based on low earnings, compared to 29% of
Hispanic/Latinx borrowers, 22% of white borrowers, and 19% of Asian

borrowers. 57 Ultimately, Black borrowers face greater financial challenges
than any other group in repaying student loans. 58
Another major factor contributing to Black students' increased
indebtedness and difficulty repaying loans is that they are less likely to have
family wealth on which to rely for college payment in the first place or to
assist with loan repayment after graduation. In addition to disparities in
median family net worth, 59 there are striking differences in mean family net
50. See, e.g., Kim A. Weedon, OccupationalSegregation, PATHWAYS MAG., Special
Edition 2019, at 33, 35 (attributing 39% of the $2.40 per hour wage gap between white and
Black millennials to occupational segregation and 39%-45% in the case of the Hispanic-white
wage gap; Asian millennials earn about $1.46 more per hour than white workers with
approximately half of the wage gap attributable to occupational segregation); ANTHONY P.
CARNEVALE, MEGAN L. FASULES, ANDREA PORTER & JENNIFER LANDIS-SANTOS, CTR. ON
EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, GEORGETOWN UNIV., AFRICAN AMERICANS: COLLEGE MAJORS

AND EARNINGS 4-5 (2016), https://lgyhoq479ufd3yna29x7ubjn-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp[https://penna.cc/4BM4-6V8A]
content/uploads/AfricanAmericanMajors_2016_web.pdf
(suggesting that the lack of Black representation in high-paying jobs impacts Black students'
choice of major career opportunities).
51. See, e.g., Tomaz Cajner, Tyler Radler, David Ratner & Ivan Vidangos, Racial Gaps
in Labor Market Outcomes in the Last Four Decades and Over the Business Cycle 23 (Fed.
Rsrv. Bd., Working Paper No. 2017-071, 2017) (discussing race-based labor market
discrimination).
52. TICAS, 2019 QUICK FACTS, supra note 45.
53. See GOULD ET AL., supra note 48, at 14 fig.F.
54. See Weedon, supra note 50.
55. See, e.g., VERONICA GONZALEZ, LINDSAY AHLMAN & ANA FUNG, THE INST. FOR
COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, STUDENT DEBT AND THE CLASS OF 2018, at 9 (2019),

https://ticas.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/classof2O18.pdf [https://perma.cciLW9B-U6X8]
(providing loan default figures for undergraduates beginning college in the 2003-2004 academic
year).
56. See TICAS, 2019 STUDENT DEBT, supra note 43, at 13.
57. Id. at 12.
58. See id.
59. See Bhutta et al., supra note 21, at 11 tbl.2 (providing median net household worth
by race).
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worth. 60 For white non-Hispanics, mean family net worth is $983,400.61 For

Hispanic or Latinx families, that figure is $165,500; for Blacks, it is $142,500;
for families of "other" or multiple races, it is $657,200.62 Simply put, Black
families are poorer than other families by traditional economic measures. 63
For all students, lack of family financial resources undoubtedly impacts
their likelihood of attending undergraduate, graduate, or professional school.
Although some poor and middle-class families can take advantage of certain
tax benefits for higher education, which are discussed in the next Part, the
greatest tax benefits are reserved for the wealthiest, who are also more likely
to attend (and graduate from) college in the first place. 64 Furthermore, students
from wealthy families are more likely to attend an elite college and enjoy
easier pathways to well-paying jobs. 65
Mainly, the gift tax exemption for direct tuition payments allows the
donee to avoid incurring any debt while obtaining many years of schooling.
Unlike debt-ridden students who are burdened by the need to repay hefty
loans, tuition-gifted donees are already on their way to accumulating wealth
at graduation. 66 In sum, tax benefits for higher education disproportionally
accrue to those who can already afford it.
III. TAX BENEFITS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
A.

Overview of Income Tax Benefits

Some of the most well-known federal tax benefits include the American
Opportunity Tax Credit and Lifetime Learning Credit; 67 a limited deduction
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. The ability of families to contribute to the educational costs of their children differ by
race. Whereas 58% of Black young adults report an average of $4,200 family contribution to
college educational expenses, 72% of white young adults report an average family contribution
of $12,000 to the same expenses. Fenaba R. Addo, Parents' Wealth Helps Explain Racial
Disparities in Student Loan Debt, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/in-the-balance/2018/parents-wealth-helps-explainracial-disparities-in-student-loan-debt [perma.cc/LRE5-PGRW].
64.

INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION

2019, at 5 fig.4 (2019), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicatortbe.asp [https://penna.cc/PS
97-BAGB] (showing that students from the highest quintile of socioeconomic status are more
likely than other students to enroll at four-year private or public institutions).
65. See id. at 6 fig.5 (showing that 37% of students in the highest quintile of
socioeconomic status enrolled in highly selective four-year institutions, compared to 7% of
students in the lowest quintile).
66. See infra Section III.B (discussing wealth transfer tax benefits).
67. See I.R.C. § 25A(b) (American Opportunity Tax Credit); § 25A(c) (Lifetime
Learning Credit).

2021 ]

TAX BENEFITS, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND RACE

795

for interest on education loans; 68 an exclusion from gross income for gain on
contributions to an education individual retirement account (more commonly
known as a Coverdell education savings account); 69 and an exclusion for gain
on contributions to qualified tuition programs (more commonly known as 529

plans) as well as the principal-the amounts initially invested-if used for
certain educational expenses. 70 Each of these tax benefits has varying income
limits, maximums, and particular rules; navigating them can be quite
complex. 7 ' When families are able to avail themselves of tax benefits for
higher education, the savings are real. For the 2018 tax year, the number of
tax returns filed claiming educational tax benefits (with some eligible for more
one benefit) was in the millions: approximately 7.4 million claimed the
American Opportunity Tax Credit,72 8.7 million claimed the Lifetime
Learning Credit, 73 and 12.4 million claimed the deduction for interest on
student loans. 74
Based on official government statistics, it is difficult to know how many
taxpayers report (tax-free) income from Coverdell education savings
accounts. 75 According to industry reports, in 2018, the aggregate assets under

management in Coverdell accounts were approximately $26 billion. 76 In
comparison, in June of 2020, there were an estimated 14.6 million separate
529 accounts with approximately $373.5 billion in assets under

68. See § 221. This section permits a deduction for interest paid during the taxable year
on any qualified education loan in an amount up to $2,500 for taxpayers with modified adjusted
gross income of $70,000 or less. See Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 2019-47 I.R.B 1099.
69. See § 530.
70. See § 529(a)-(b).
71. Compare § 25A(b)(1), (d)(1) (limiting the American Opportunity Tax Credit to a
maximum of $2,500 per student with a phase-out for single taxpayers with modified adjusted
gross income over $80,000 or $160,000 for married taxpayers filing a joint return), with
§ 25A(c)(1), (d)(2), (h)(2) (limiting the Lifetime Learning Credit to $2,000 per taxpayer with a
phase-out for single taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income of $59,000, or $138,000 for
married taxpayers filing a joint return).
72. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 16, at 218 tbl.3.3 (estimating that
7,382,500 returns claim American Opportunity Tax Credits in the aggregate amount of
$6,393,866).
73. See id. at 215 tbl.3.3 (estimating that 8,700,169 returns claim nonrefundable
education credits in the aggregate amount of $8,930,906).
74. See id. at 64 tbl.1.4 (estimating that 12,425,040 returns claim student loan interest
deduction in the aggregate amount of $13,434,708).
75. For tax return purposes, income from Coverdell education savings accounts is
included on the same line as income from prizes, awards, jury duty fees, and other items. See id
at 292 (describing the "other net income or net loss" reported by taxpayers on Form 1040 as
including income from Coverdell education savings accounts).
76.

Brian Boswell, Should We Terminate the Coverdell Education Savings Account?,

FORBES (Jan. 8, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianboswell/2020/01/08/shoul
d-we-terminate-the-coverdell-education-savings-account [https://perma.cc/FT69-JMWU].
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management.7 7 Because 529 plans have no annual contribution or income

limitations on taxpayers who may establish them, 529 plans dwarf Coverdell
accounts' importance in the college savings landscape. 78 All of these and other
income tax benefits for higher education7 9 can work in tandem with estate and
gift tax rules, as discussed in the next Section.
At the same time, many tax credits for higher education are nonrefundable
and fail to assist students and families with low taxable income. 80 Likewise,
for families with little or no discretionary income, 529 and similar savings
plans are beyond reach. 81
B.

Overview of Wealth Transfer Tax Benefits

The purpose of the gift tax is firstly to protect the estate tax by allowing
the decedent to make lifetime gifts that deplete the decedent's potential estate
and secondly to protect the income tax by dividing a large estate.8 2 Any benefit
provision that ignores or "excludes" a transfer of property from gift tax
undermines the decedent's transfer tax base.
For example, if tuition for one grandchild is $50,000 and a donor

grandmother has five grandchildren, her transfer tax base can be depleted to

77. See 529 Plan Data, COLL. SAV. PLANS NETWORK (June 30, 2020),
https://www.collegesavings.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/529-Plan-Data-June-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4435-3PYN].
78. There is greater flexibility in how Coverdell education savings accounts can be
invested compared to 529 plans, but the cap on annual Coverdell contributions has never been
indexed for inflation. See, e.g., Boswell, supra note 76 (arguing that, because of the greater
versatility of 529 plans, "now may be a good time to discontinue the venerable Coverdell
Education Savings Account entirely").
79. For other higher-education tax benefits, see I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E); § 135; § 62(a)(18);
§ 222. Scholarships, fellowships, and tuition reductions are beyond the scope of this Article. See
§ 117 (qualified scholarships); § 127 (employer-provided education expenses); § 162(a)
(business deductions for employment-related expenses); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5
(specifying that certain education expenditures made by an individual are deductible as ordinary
and necessary business expenses).
80.

Phyllis C. Smith, The Elusive Cap and Gown: The Impact of Tax Policy on Access to

&

&

Higher Educationfor Low-Income Individuals and Families, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L.
POL'Y 181, 186, 211 (2008) (calling for existing credits to be made fully refundable for
qualifying low-income students).
81. See id. at 216, 219-20 (encouraging direct need-based grants for low-income
students).
82. Roswell Magill, The Federal Gift Tax, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 773 (1940)
(summarizing the legislative reasoning "(1) that a gift tax is a necessary corollary to an estate
tax, to prevent what is termed the 'evasion' of the estate tax through inter vivos gifts; and (2)
that a gift tax is a necessary corollary to an income tax, to prevent the loss of surtax revenue
through the splitting of large estates"); see also JOSEPH M. DODGE, WENDY C. GERZOG
BRIDGET

J.

35 (2011).

CRAWFORD, FEDERAL TAXES ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: LAW AND PLANNING
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the extent of $250,000 per year. If the donor pays that same tuition for each
grandchild's private school from kindergarten through twelfth grade and then
for four years of college, she can reduce her estate tax estate by a total of $4.25
million under current law. With additional law school or medical school
tuition added to that sum, this is real money, as they say-a significant
reduction in the grandmother's transfer tax base.83
Under current law, an estate tax return is required for a decedent who died
in 2017 with combined gross assets and prior taxable gifts exceeding $5.49
million.8 4 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) 85 more than doubled that
amount temporarily for decedents dying in years 2018 through 2025-when

the 2017 legislation will sunset and the gift and estate tax exemption will
return to the pre-TCJA lower exemption levels with adjustments for
inflation. 86 In 2021, the wealth transfer tax exemption is $11.7 million.8 7

Given that mean household wealth in the United States is $748,800 and
median household wealth is $121,700,88 most individuals never have to worry
about wealth transfer taxes (i.e., federal gift, estate, or generation-skipping
transfer taxes). For the wealthiest Americans, though, wealth transfer taxes
are important practical considerations with real consequences. For transfers in
excess of the exemption threshold, gift and estate tax rates can climb as high
as 40%.89 Thus, many lawyers and other advisors have full-time careers
counseling wealthy individuals about how to make tax-advantaged-and even
tax-free-transfers to family members.
Two important gift tax carve-outs under I.R.C.

§ 2503 allow wealthy

individuals to make tax-free lifetime transfers that, over time, can both reduce
the size of their taxable estate and substantially enrich younger generation
family members or other individuals. First are annual exclusion gifts under
83. The actual tax savings would be more than the above amounts as the grandmother
would, without the current exclusion, also be taxed under the generation-skipping transfer tax.
See I.R.C. § 2642.
84. See Estate Tax, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-

employed/estate-tax [https://penna.cc/Y67D-95WD]. Wealth transfer taxes are irrelevant for
most Americans. For example, in the 2021 taxable year, unmarried individuals can transfer up
to $11.7 million in combined lifetime and deathtime gifts without paying any federal gift or
estate tax, and that tax-free amount is $23.4 million for a married couple. See Rev. Proc. 202045, 2020-46 I.R.B. 1016. Tax exemptions, however, may change under the Biden
Administration. Ashlea Ebeling, IRS Announces Higher Estate and Gift Tax Limitsfor 2021,
FORBES (Oct. 26, 2020, 10:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2020/10/26/
irs-announces-higher-estate-and-gift-tax-limits-for-2021 [https://perma.cc/XQ2E-Z3LQ]. For a
discussion of President Biden's tax proposals, see infra Section IV.C.3.
85. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
86. Id. § 11061(a).
87. See Rev. Proc. 2020-45, 2020-46 I.R.B. 1016.
88. Bhutta et al., supra note 21, at 10 (providing median net household worth by race).
89. See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (estate tax rate schedule); § 2502(a) (gift tax calculated by
reference to estate tax).
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§ 2503(b). 90 Separate and apart from the current $11.7 million

exemption amount available to every taxpayer, each individual can make an
unlimited number of annual transfers of up to $15,000 per donee. 91 For

married couples who agree to gift-split, these annual exclusion gifts can be up
to $30,000 per beneficiary per year. 92 There is no limit on the number of

annual exclusion gifts that a taxpayer can make to multiple donees in any one
year, nor is there a cap on the number of years that a taxpayer may do so. 93
To be sure, a single annual exclusion gift is unlikely to reduce a large
estate meaningfully enough to escape the estate tax at death. But if a taxpayer
makes a series of annual exclusion gifts to many donees over a period of years
(such as by making transfers outright or in certain trusts for the benefit of
children and grandchildren), the donor can shift a substantial amount of taxfree wealth to intended beneficiaries and reduce the size of the gross estate for
estate tax purposes. Annual exclusion gifts are powerful estate planning tools
in this regard. 94
The second notable carve out under I.R.C.

§ 2503 is the gift tax exclusion

for "qualified transfers," which are defined as amounts paid on behalf of an
individual as tuition to certain educational organizations or to any person who
provides medical care (as defined in § 213(d)) with respect to an individual. 95
Practically speaking, this means that a grandmother, for example, can pay
tuition costs for all of her grandchildren from primary through graduate school
without any of the transfers being treated as taxable gifts. 96 When a
90. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1)-(2) (providing an exemption amount of $10,000, which is
indexed for inflation). From 1942 through 1981, the annual exclusion was $3,000. In 1982, the
amount of the yearly exclusion increased to $10,000 because of what Congress saw as the
"substantial increases in price levels" over those years. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 97TH
CONG., GEN. EXPLANATION OF THE ECON. RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 273 (Comm. Print

1981); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441(a), 95 Stat. 172,
319. In 2021, the annual exclusion amount is $15,000. See Rev. Proc. 2020-45, 2020-46 I.R.B.

1016.
91. See Rev. Proc. 2020-45, 2020-46 I.R.B. 1016.
92. For gift-splitting rules, see I.R.C. § 2513.
93.

See Bridget J. Crawford, Reform the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion to Raise Revenue,

132 TAX NOTES 443, 443 (2011).
94. But see id. at 446 (proposing limits to annual exclusion gifts to outright transfers and
those transfers that will be included in the beneficiary's gross estate).
95. § 2503(e). These transfers can also shield taxpayers from the generation-skipping
transfer tax (GSTT). § 2642(c)(3)(B). Section 2642(c)(1) provides that a direct skip, which is a
nontaxable gift, has an inclusion ratio of zero (and thus no GSTT).
96. Note that the grandmother's payment must be made directly to the educational
institution; it cannot pass through the grandchild's hands first. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6(b)(2)
(as amended in 2020). Payments forbooks, supplies, dormitory fees, board, and similar expenses
are not direct tuition expenses and, therefore, would be treated as taxable gifts but could be
covered by the annual exclusion under I.R.C. § 2503(a). Further note that the tax-free treatment
of direct tuition payments under I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A) is not limited to institutions of higher
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grandmother pays many years' worth of private, college, and graduate or

professional school expenses for all of her grandchildren and others, this
benefit likely results in a large, unwarranted reduction in the grandmother's
transfer tax base. The grandmother could also pay for any of her
grandchildren's medical expenses that are not covered by insurance or
otherwise, such as paying orthodontists' bills directly. 97
These direct payments of educational or medical expenses benefit not
only the donor's grandchildren but also the donor's children, as parents of the
donee students (for educational expenses) or patients (for medical expenses)
no longer need to pay out of pocket. Combined with annual exclusion gifts,
the hypothetical grandmother can both substantially increase the wealth of
younger generations and reduce the size of her own taxable estate. For
taxpayers in a position to make regular direct payments of tuition or other
qualified expenses, these payments can be an important part of their estate

plan. 98
C.

Tax Expendituresfor Education

With each tax benefit for higher education, the government forgoes a
certain amount of tax revenue. During the 2020 fiscal year, the estimated total
income tax expenditures for education were approximately $32.7 billion, with
large expenditures in the form of tax credits and deductions for postsecondary
education expenses ($16.4 billion). 99 Deductions for student loan interest
($1.9 billion), Coverdell education savings accounts ($40 million), and 529
plans ($2.2 billion) were sizeable expenditures as well.1 00

education. Under § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii), almost any nonprofit educational organization with a
regular faculty, curriculum, and enrolled body of students is an eligible recipient of a "qualified
transfer" for purposes of the statute. Direct tuition payments made to a foreign university can
meet the definition of a qualified transfer. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6(c) (example 1).
97. As with direct payments of tuition to educational institutions, payments of medical
expenses made directly to the individual rendering medical care are qualified transfers, but
reimbursements to the patient are not. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6(c) (examples 3 and 4).
98. See, e.g., DODGE ET AL., supra note 82, at 78-79 (discussing direct payments for
education or medical expenses under I.R.C. § 2503(e)); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 11032805 (Jan. 13, 2006) (treating taxpayer's substantial direct prepayments of tuition as excluded from
the gift tax under I.R.C. § 2503(e)). Note, however, written determinations are not precedent.
I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3).
99.

See ProjectedIncome Tax Expenditure Budget, TAx POL'Y CTR. (Feb. 4, 2020),

https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/projected-income-tax-expenditure-budget [https://pe
rma.cc/NL4J-ATAM] (aggregating all education expenditures, including exclusion of interest
on student-loan bonds, credits for zone academy bonds, and exclusion of employer-provided
education assistance, among other items). But cf INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 16, at

tbl.1.4.
100. See ProjectedIncome Tax ExpenditureBudget, supra note 99.
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For annual exclusion gifts or direct payments of educational or medical
expenses, it is difficult to estimate the revenue cost with precision. For gifts
made during the calendar year 2009, for example, over 211,000 returns were

filed, showing total annual exclusion gifts of almost $9 billion.101 Most of
these gifts probably represent a deduction from larger gifts made to the same
beneficiaries that year. 0 2 IRS data likely underrepresents the number and
amount of gifts under I.R.C. § 2503(b) because many taxpayers do not file a
gift tax return if they make only annual exclusion gifts.1 03 The primary
exception would be for stand-alone annual exclusion gifts of assets other than
cash or marketable securities if the taxpayer wants to start the statute of
limitations.1 04 In that case, the taxpayer must adequately disclose the transfer
on the gift tax return.1 05

In any event, there is absolutely no available tax data on direct payments
of educational or medical expenses under I.R.C. § 2503(e). Again, because
these transfers are not subject to the gift tax, most taxpayers do not see any
reason to include them on a gift tax return. Furthermore, because qualified
transfers under I.R.C. § 2503(e) are almost certainly made in cash, there is no
valuation concern that might prompt taxpayers to file a gift tax return.1 06 For
these reasons, the total tax expenditures associated with I.R.C. § 2503(e) are
impossible to estimate. As a practical matter, taxpayers must have a certain
level of income or wealth to make annual exclusion gifts or qualified transfers.
In the absence of tax data, one cannot accurately know the demographics of
taxpayers in this category, but strong inferential evidence suggests they tend

to be almost exclusively white.1 07

101. See Melissa J. Belvedere, 2009 Gifts, STAT. INCOME BULL., Spring 2012, at 142, 146
tbl.1.
102. See id. at 142 (explaining that aggregate gift tax liability reported by the IRS considers
adjustments for the annual exclusion).
103. See Justin Ransome & Frances Schafer, Back to the Basics: Common Gift Tax Return
Mistakes, TAX ADVISER (July 1, 2020), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2010/jul/ransom
e-ju1y2010.html [https://penna.cc/Y5CD-9Q75].
104. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(9) (codifying an exception for stand-alone annual exclusion
gifts).
105. § 6501(f)(2) (requiring adequate disclosure); see Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(c)-1(f)(2)
(defining adequate disclosure).
106. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
107. See infra Part IV.
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IV. A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE TAX BENEFITS FOR DIRECT PAYMENTS OF
COLLEGE TUITION

A.

The Racial Wealth Gap

A staggering wealth gap exists between the rich and poor in the United
States. In 2020, according to the Federal Reserve, the wealthiest 1% of all

households held more than 3 0 % of the nation's wealth.1 08 Expanding the
figure to the top 10% of all households, that group accounted for 69% of all
wealth.1 09 The bottom 50% of the population, in contrast, owned a mere 1.9%
of all household wealth." 0 The United States has not always been such an
economically divided nation. In the late 1970s, the top 1% held approximately
22% of all household wealth, and the percentage has been steadily rising ever
since."1
It is important to understand economic inequality not only in terms of
families generically but also with respect to other identity characteristics, such
as race. The average white family is seven times wealthier than the average
Black family and five times wealthier than the average Hispanic/Latinx
family."1 2 Of the upper 50% of households by wealth, the percentages of
families vary by race: 59% of white families fall into the top 50%, compared

to 51% of Asian families, 25% of Hispanic/Latinx families, and 23% of Black
families." 3 Wealth inequality between Black and white households in
particular has gotten significantly worse-not better-since the pre-Civil

108. See Distribution of Household Wealth in the U.S. Since 1989, FED. RSRV.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z 1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/chart/#quarter:0;series:Net%
20worth;demographic:networth;population:1,3,5,7;units:levels;range:2005.2,2020.2 [https://pe
rma.cc/TB5Y-MQ8Q] [hereinafter FED. RSRV., Wealth]; Tommy Beer, Top 1% of US.
Households Hold 15 Times More Than Bottom 50% Combined, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2020, 5:15
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/10/08/top-1-of-us-households-hold-15times-more-wealth-than-bottom-50-combined [https://perma.cc/2WBJ-QBMQ].
109. See FED. RSRV., Wealth, supra note 108 (showing that, for the second quarterof 2020,
the top 1% held 30.8% of wealth and the top 90-99% held 38.4% of wealth); CHERYL R.
COOPER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45813, AN OVERVIEW OF CONSUMER FINANCE AND POLICY

ISSUES 3 (2021).
110. See FED. RSRV., Wealth, supra note 108; Beer, supra note 108.
111. See EMMANUEL SAEz & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE: HOW THE

RICH DODGE TAxES AND HOW TO MAKE THEM PAY 97-98 (2019) (including figure 5.3, which
graphically compares wealth shares of the top 1% and bottom 90% between the years 1910 and
2020).
112. Serena Lei, Nine Charts About Wealth Inequality in America, URB. INST. (Oct. 5,

2017), https://apps.urban.org/features/wealth-inequality-charts [https://perma.cc/QL3L-GE95]
("Despite some fluctuations over the past five decades, this disparity [in 2016] is as high or
higher than it was in 1963.").
113. See BOSHARA ET AL., supra note 22, at 6 tbl.1 (providing figures for median family
net worth by racial group).
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Rights era." 4 The aggregate share of household wealth held by Black families
is so low that the wealthiest 100 individuals on the Forbes 400 list collectively
have as much wealth as all Black families in the entire country." 5 The
wealthiest 186 people on that same list have as much wealth as all
Hispanic/Latinx families combined."1 6
Broadening the discussion beyond the wealthiest few on a small list, of
all households in the United States with a net worth of at least $2 million, the
vast majority (76%) are white." 7 Asian and Black/African-Americans
represent 8% of these households each, with Hispanic/Latinx families
representing 7% and "other" races representing 1%.118 Along the Black/white
axis, white families possess an estimated 85% of the nation's wealth, with
Blacks owning only 4.1% .1 9

By any measure, then, white families overrepresent those who are most
likely to take advantage of tax benefits for higher education, such as 529
plans,120 annual exclusion gifts,'21 and direct tuition payments.1 22 Tax benefits

for higher education should be better calibrated to assist those with greatest
need. Although a complete analysis of all higher education tax benefits is
beyond the scope of this Article, the next Section proposes eliminating one
particular benefit that is available to taxpayers who need it least: the exclusion
from gift tax under I.R.C.

B.

§ 2503(e)(2)(A) for direct tuition payments.

DismantlingRacialPrivilege by Repealing .R.C.

§ 2503(e)(2)(A)

Taking seriously the notion that tax laws are part of the political choices
that represent a collective national "self," as Professor Anthony Infanti has

114. Moritz Kuhn, Moritz Schularick & Ulrike I. Steins, Income and Wealth Inequality in

America, 1949-2016, 128 J. POL. ECON. 3469, 3472 ("Income disparities today are as big as
they were in the pre-civil rights era. In 2016, black household income is still only half of the
income of white households. The racial wealth gap is even wider and is still as large as it was in
the 1950s and 1960s. The median black household persistently has less than 15% of the wealth
of the median white household.").
115. DEDRICK ASANTE-MUHAMMED, CHUCK COLLINS, JOSH HOXLE & EMANUEL
NIEVES, CFED & INST. FOR POL'Y STUD., THE EVER-GROWING GAP 5 (2016), https://ips-

dc.org/report-ever-growing-gap/ [https://perma.cc/EV4N-PCHS].
116. Id.
117. Distributionof US. Millionairesby Race/Ethnicity, As of 2013, STATISTA (Mar. 31,
2013), https://www.statista.com/statistics/300528/us-millionaires-race-ethnicity/ [https://perma
.cc/V9TY-FRHJ] (defining "millionaire" somewhat counterintuitively as those having a
household net worth of $2 million or more).
118. Id.
119. Beer, supra note 108.
120. See supra Section III.A.
121. See supra Section III.B.
122. See supra Section III.B.
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explained,1 23 the function and impact of I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A) merit further
examination. In practical terms, this provision allows taxpayers with enough
income or wealth (or both) to make unlimited tax-free gifts of preparatory,
college, or graduate school tuition if they pay the educational institution
directly (as opposed to writing a check to a grandchild, for example, who then
writes a check to the school).1 24 The taxpayers in this financial category are
overwhelmingly white.1 25 So are the students who are most likely to be legacy
college applicants,1 26 employed after graduation,1 27 and recipients of an
inheritance from their families.1 28 In other words, I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A)
should be understood as part of a system that contributes to and sustains white
financial well-being to the near total (but not complete) exclusion of other
races. When one understands the tax system to be deeply implicated in the
racial wealth gap and views tax-free direct tuition payments as inconsistent
with the policies of wealth transfer taxes,1 29 then any serious effort to narrow
that gap should include the repeal of I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A).
Eliminating this particular tax benefit has positive economic and
symbolic value in anti-racist advocacy; however, compared to a drastic
reduction in the gift and estate tax exemption, the financial impact is small.
Furthermore, wealthy individuals likely would not feel much of a "pinch" in
their pocketbooks if I.R.C.

§ 2503(e)(2)(A) was repealed.1 30 These taxpayers

could still make annual exclusion gifts of $15,000 to intended beneficiaries
who can then use the money to pay educational expenses.' 3 ' Donor-taxpayers
could also generously fund 529 plans without being taxed on interest when

123. See ANTHONY C. INFANTI, OUR SELFISH TAX LAWS: TOWARD TAX REFORM THAT
MIRRORS OUR BETTER SELVES 1 (2018).

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
supra Section IV.A.
supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Neil Bhutta, Andrew C. Chang, Lisa J. Dettling & Joanne W. Hsu, Disparitiesin
Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RSRV.: FEDS NOTES (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/not
es/feds-notes/disparities-in-wealth-by-race-and-ethnicity-in-the-2019-survey-of-consumer-fina
nces-20200928.htm [https://penna.cc/Y56E-V79D] (reporting in Table 2 that 29.9% of all white
families actually received an inheritance compared to 10.1% of Black families, 7.2% of
Hispanic/Latinx families, and 17.8% of "other" families and further reporting that 17.1% of
whites, compared with 6% of Blacks, 4.2% of Hispanic/Latinx families, and 14.7% of "others,"
expect to receive an inheritance). The size of the median expected inheritance also differs by
race: $195,500 for whites; $100,000 for Blacks; $150,000 for Hispanic/Latinx families; and
$100,000 for "others." Id.
129. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
130. Cf IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 9 (2019) (describing the general
concept of anti-racism as more than the absence of racism).
131. See supra Section III.B (discussing annual exclusion).
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those funds are used for educational purposes. 3 2 To the extent that annual
exclusion gifts or 529 plan proceeds are not enough for these purposes,

taxpayers could always use some of their wealth transfer tax exemption.1 33
And for generous taxpayers who have already given away their full exemption
amount, there remains the possibility of making taxable gifts.1 34
Even after the repeal of I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A), there are still other ways
for wealthy taxpayers to assist intended beneficiaries with education
expenses. However, they cannot avail themselves of that particular and
potentially large tax benefit for direct tuition payments. Ultimately, the gift
tax exclusion for direct tuition payments is unnecessary and mainly serves a
white wealth preservation function.1 35 Furthermore, tax-free treatment for
direct tuition payments unfairly advantages transfers that are typically subject
to wealth transfer taxes and that otherwise undermine the transfer tax base.1 36

132. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The aggregate amount that can be held in
529 plans for a particular beneficiary varies by state and ranges from approximately $235,000
to $529,000. Kathryn Flynn, How Much Can You Contribute to a 529 Plan in 2020?,
SAVINGFORCOLLEGE.COM (Aug. 16, 2020), https://www.savingforcollege.com/article/howmuch-can-you-contribute-to-a-529-plan [https://perma.cc/W2WX-3KRE]. Distributions are
tax-free if they are used to pay a "qualified higher education expenses," defined as "tuition, fees,
books, supplies, and equipment required for the enrollment or attendance of a designated
beneficiary at an eligible educational institution, among other items." I.R.C. § 529(a), (b)(1),

(e)(3).
133. See supra Section III.B (describing the wealth transfer tax exemption).
134. See § 2501 (imposing a tax on gifts); § 2502(a) (providing gift tax rates by reference
to I.R.C. § 2001). Making inter vivos taxable gifts still provides a tax advantage. Those transfers
are computed on a tax exclusive basis; that is, the transfer tax imposed on those gifts is not itself
subject to a transfer tax like an estate or income tax, which are both tax inclusive. See, e.g.,
DODGE ET AL., supra note 82, at 38.
135. In a separate context, Professors Daniel Hemel and Kyle Rozema have suggested that
repeal of tax benefits for high-income taxpayers may, in fact, further benefit those taxpayers.
Daniel Hemel & Kyle Rozema, Inequality and the MortgageInterest Deduction, 70 TAX L. REV.
667, 678-89 (2017). It is unclear whether the same would be true in the case of a repeal of I.R.C.
§ 2503(e)(2)(A). Cf id. at 702 (finding that the distributional consequences of a state and local
tax deduction repeal critically depend on the details of the tax reform that repeal is used to
finance).
136. See supra Section IV.C.
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Section 2503(e)(2)(A) Inappropriately Advantages Capital-Like
Expenditures
1.

CongressionalIntent in 1981

Although annual exclusions have existed since the federal gift tax was
enacted in 1924,137 the exclusion for direct payments of educational and
medical expenses was not made part of the Code until 1981.138 In enacting

I.R.C. § 2503(e), Congress indicated the new provision had a different
purpose than the gift tax annual exclusion.1 39 Whereas I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1)
eliminated the need to account for multiple small transfers, such as birthday
and holiday presents, Congress intended I.R.C. § 2503(e) to assist taxpayers
who otherwise might be unaware that their transfers were technically taxable
gifts under the law at the time.14 0
Professor Kerry Ryan hypothesizes that Congress's decision to add a new
exclusion for direct tuition and medical payments-as opposed to merely
expanding the annual exclusion-is attributable to the size and irregularity of
educational and medical expenses.141 She also notes in hindsight that, as a
factual matter, because educational and medical expenses have risen more
steeply than general inflation adjustments for the annual exclusion, the annual
exclusion benefit by itself would not have been able to fully cover those costs
today (particularly at private educational institutions).1 42 These rationales for

137. See Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 501-531, 47 Stat. 169, 245-59 (1932) (current
version at I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (describing gift tax generally)). For the annual exclusion, see id
§ 504(b), 47 Stat. at 247.
138. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441(b), 95
Stat. 172, 319 (showing that the exclusion for direct payments of educational and medical
expenses was not made part of the Internal Revenue Code until 1981).
139. See H.R. REP. No. 97-201, at 193 (1981) (noting concern that "payments of tuition
made on behalf of children . . and medical expenses on behalf of the elderly" were technically
gifts under the current law). The Treasury Department incorporated this perspective into the
regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6(a)-(b) (1984) (describing the exclusion for qualified
transfers for educational or medical expenses as "available in addition to the $10,000 annual gift
tax exclusion" and available "to any person who provides medical care," as defined in section
213(d), with respect to that individual). This regulation also highlights the legislative intent to
provide broad application of this benefit: the exclusion "is permitted without regard to the
relationship between the donor and the donee." § 25.2503-6(a).
140. See H.R. REP. No. 97-201, at 193 ("The committee believes suchpayments should be
exempt from gift taxes without regard to the amount paid for such purposes.").
141. Kerry A. Ryan, Human Capital and Transfer Taxation, 62 OKLA. L. REv. 223, 240-

41(2010).
142. Id. at 241 ("[E]ven if Congress had raised the level of the annual exclusion in 1981 to
capture most of these [tuition and medical] transfers, general inflation adjustments thereafter
would not have kept up with annual increases in these costs. Average annual increase in college
tuition and medical expenses have outpaced inflation since the early 1980s.").
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the addition of I.R.C.
now.

2.

§ 2503(e) in 1981 actually bolster the case for its repeal

Size and Nature of Gifts Under I.R.C.

§ 2503(e)

The gift tax exclusion for direct payments of educational and medical
expenses originated with a 1969 proposal from the American Law Institute

(ALI) to exempt from taxation three categories of transfers: (1) a transfer that
does not result in a member of the transferor's household or a child of the
transferor under the age of twenty-one "acquiring property which will retain

significant value after the passage of one year from the date of such
expenditure;" (2) a transfer for "current educational, medical or dental costs
of any person;" and (3) a transfer for "reasonable" expenditures for "costs of
food, clothing and maintenance . . of any person in fact dependent on the
transferor."1 43 In other words, under the ALI proposal, for consumption-type
expenses, the identity of the transferee (as the transferor's household member
or dependent) was relevant. Also, these expenses were subject to some
financial standard (either "insignificant" or "reasonable").
As enacted in 1981, however, the statute provides an expansive and open-

ended transfer tax benefit: the identity of the donee does not matter; the donor
can use this exclusion for an unlimited number of donees; there is no cap on
total cumulative amounts paid as tuition; and there is no restriction on the total
number of years the donor can use and benefit from this exclusion.1 44
Congress adopted this variation of the ALI's second recommendation
(ignoring the other two ALI recommendations), limiting the gift tax exclusion
to amounts paid directly on behalf of an individual as tuition to certain
educational organizations (or to medical providers, although I.R.C.
§ 2503(e)(2)(B) is beyond the scope of this discussion).1 4 5
Practically speaking, the ALI's proposal that consumption-type transfers
should be tax-free makes sense. The gift tax's original purpose was to serve
as a backstop to the estate tax (although, arguably, it has done so weakly at
many points in history).1 46 In the case of transfers without significant estate-

143. AM. L. INST., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND REPORTERS' STUDIES 5-6 (1969).

144. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441(b), 95
Stat. 172, 319.
145. See id.; I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(B) (permitting a gift tax exclusion for direct payments to
providers of medical care as defined in I.R.C. § 213(d)).
146. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 8 (1932); S. REP. NO. 72-665, at 11 (1932); Smith v.
Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 (1943) ("[T]he gift tax serves to supplement the estate tax.");
Ryan, supra note 141, at 241. But see Wendy C. Gerzog, Contingencies and the Gift Tax, 93
TAX NOTES 977, 985 (2001) (re-examining the purpose of the gift tax considering a potential
repeal of the estate tax).
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depleting effects, there is little concern that taxpayers are attempting to shrink
their taxable estates to avoid estate taxation. But given the cost of higher
education, gifts in the form of direct tuition payments can have an estatedepleting impact-and potentially a sizeable one-and thus, logically, should
be subject to the gift tax.1 47 Indeed, it is precisely because of the size of these
payments that gift taxation is appropriate.1 48

'

The proposition that direct tuition payments differ from other
consumption-like transfers proposed for tax-free treatment under the ALI
proposal is supported by reference to the income tax treatment of similar
expenditures.1 49 In the income tax context, investments in human capital, such
as building one's professional reputation 50 or acquiring general education,' 5
are typically treated as non-deductible personal expenses. 5 2 It is factually true
that higher education enhances an individual's employment, health, and other
prospects.' 53 In the case of students who attend elite colleges, there also may
be additional social and networking benefits that are not available to students
at less selective schools. 5 4 Thus, in a practical sense, tuition payments
147. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Replacing the Estate Tax with a ReimaginedAccessions

Tax, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 997, 1052 (2009) (explaining the general concept that estate-depleting
transfers tend to be subject to wealth transfer tax whereas transfers, such as those for full and
adequate consideration, do not have that effect and thus escape taxation). Again, it may be
appropriate to consider repeal of the tax-free treatment for direct payments to a medical care
provider under I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(B), but that is outside the scope of this discussion.
148. Cf supra note 141 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (describing the categories of expenses in
the ALI's proposal).
150. E.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114-16 (1933) (disallowing deduction for
the taxpayer's payments intended to build his own business reputation after his previous
employer declared bankruptcy and left several creditors unpaid). For a critique of the differing
income tax treatment for businesses versus individuals, see Mary Louise Fellows & Lily Kahng,
Costly Mistakes: UndertaxedBusiness Owners andOvertaxed Workers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
329, 331 (2013) (arguing that some business expenditures are classified as investments when
they are in fact consumption and that some expenditures by workers are treated as consumption
when they are in fact investments).
151. E.g., Sharon v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 515, 525 (1976) (denying the taxpayer's claimed
deductions for college and law school tuition expenses on the grounds that these "provided him
with a general education which will be beneficial to him in a wide variety of ways"), aff'd, 591
F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
152. See Loretta Collins Argrett, Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenditures: An
Unfair Investment Disincentive, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 621, 622 (1990) (critiquing the income
tax treatment of most educational expenditures as non-deductible personal expenses).
153. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Stacy Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Effects of College
Characteristicsover the Career Using Administrative Earnings Data, 49 J. HUM. RES. 323,

325-26, 350 (2014) (finding that, for most students, the "return" on investment in a selective
college is "generally indistinguishable from zero," with the two exceptions being for "racial and
ethnic minorities (black and Hispanic students) and for students whose parents have relatively
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generate benefits that redound to the prolonged future benefit of donees under
I.R.C.

§ 2503(e)(2)(A). These transfers may be immediately "consumed" in

one sense, insofar as a bill is immediately paid, but the donee's benefits are
lifelong. For the transfer of an asset that creates substantial wealth for the
donee while depleting the donor's estate, it is appropriate to impose a gift
tax. 155
3.

The DramaticIncrease in Wealth Transfer Tax Exemption Since

1981
The dramatic increase in the wealth transfer exemption since 1981 is
another reason that the repeal of tax-free treatment for direct tuition payments
is appropriate. In 1981-the year

§ 2503(e) was enacted-the estate and gift

tax exemption could shield transfers with a lifetime and deathtime aggregate
value of $175,625.156 In 2021, that equates to approximately $500,000.157 But
due to increases under several successive presidential administrations, and
most notably under the TCJA, today's wealth transfer tax exemption shields
$11.7 million in assets per person.1 58 President Biden's tax plan proposes

lowering the wealth transfer tax exemptions to 2009 levels (when the estate
tax exemption was $3.5 million and the gift tax exemption was $1 million),
little education," defined as fewer than sixteen years of formal schooling); Kevin Carey, How
Much Does Getting into an Elite College Actually Matter?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/1 5/upshot/elite-colleges-actual-value.html
[https://perma.cc/A29D-F84G] (arguing that attending elite college affords access to "social
capital" for those whose parents do not have strong academic credentials and for certain Black
and Hispanic/Latinx students).
155. Indeed, in a different context, it is the transfer of an asset with substantial future value
for minimal (or no) gift tax that informs the basis for many commentators' objections to grantor
retained annuity trusts. See, e.g., Wendy C. Gerzog, Toward aReality-BasedEstate Tax, 57 B.C.
L. REV. 1037, 1052-53 (2016) (explaining some valuation distortion techniques that erode that
taxpayers' transfer tax base).
156. See Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety
Years and Counting, STAT. INCOME BULL., Summer 2007, at 118, 122-23 (showing estate tax
exemptions and tax rates from 1916 to 2007 and explaining inflation adjustments introduced in
1976).
157. Compare US INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.usinflationcalculator.com
[https://perma.cc/D9WT-KSGQ] (enter "1981" into the "if in" box; then enter "175000" into in
the "I purchased an item for $" box; then enter "2021" into the "then in" box; then click
"calculate") (showing that an item purchased for $175,000 in 1981 would cost $506,352.59 in
2021, accounting only for inflation), with MEASURINGWORTH, https://www.measuringworth.
com/calculators/uscompare/ [https://perma.cc/Q3LS-KYRZ] (enter "1981" into "initial year"
box; then enter "$175000" into "initial amount" box; then enter "2021" into "desired year" box;
then click "calculate"; then scroll down to view "real wage or real wealth" metric) (providing a
wealth comparison of $175,000 in 1981 to $492,000 in "real wage or real wealth" in 2019).
158. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); see also supra
note 84 (providing exemption amounts for 2021).
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but that change is not certain to occur. 5 9 It is difficult to predict what changes,
if any, Congress will enact to the wealth transfer tax laws. Under any system
where more than 99.5% of all decedents pay no wealth transfer tax at all, the
wealth transfer exemption should be understood as a primary feature of a
system that allows one generation to pass economic privilege to the next.1 60

The increase in the wealth transfer tax exemption,161 along with the
widening wealth gap,1 62 has reduced the percentage of the population that will
ever owe any gift or estate tax. In 2009, when the lifetime gift tax exemption
was $1 million, fewer than 10,000 people owed any gift tax.1 63 For decedents
dying in 2009, when the estate tax exemption was $3.5 million, only 0.23%

of decedents owed any estate tax.1 64 In 2018 (the first year after the combined
wealth transfer tax exemption jumped from $5.5 million to more than $11
million),1 65 fewer than 2,200 donors owed any gift tax, and only 0.19% of

decedents owed any estate tax.1 66 Given the increased wealth transfer tax
159. See GARRETT WATSON, HUAQUN LI & TAYLOR LAJOIE, TAX FOUND., DETAILS AND
ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE BIDEN'S TAX PROPOSALS, OCTOBER

2020 UPDATE 2,4 (2020); Kay Bell, 2009-2010 Estate and Gift Tax Amounts, BANKRATE (Jan.
5, 2010), https://www.bankrate.com/finance/money-guides/2008-2009-estate-and-gift-tax-amo
unts-1.aspx [https://penna.cc/C7V5-MVZ2].
160. See Tax Policy Center's Briefing Book: Key Elements of the US. Tax System, TAX

POL'Y CTR. (May 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-many-peoplepay-estate-tax [https://penna.cc/J5YQ-SFNB] (estimating that, for 2019, estate tax returns were
filed for about 0.15% of all decedents and that only 0.07% of decedents owed any tax).
161. See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Section IV.A.
163. Belvedere, supra note 101, at 142 (reporting 9,645 taxable returns out of 223,093 gift
tax returns filed). As a percentage of the entire population, this is significantly less than 0.0001%
of all Americans. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

2011, at 8, (2010), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2010/compendia/statab/130ed
/tables/pop.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7VR-B5N2] (reporting population in 2009 as 307,43 9,000).
164. See SOI Tax Stats - Estate Tax Year of Death Tables, IRS (July 2, 2020),
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-estate-tax-year-of-death-tables [https://perma.cc/Y
78N-TJ4K] (follow "2009" hyperlink under "Table 1: Estate Tax Returns, Year of Death, Values
for Tax Purposes by Tax Status and Size of Gross Estate") (reporting 5,668 taxable returns out
of 12,940 estate tax returns filed); KENNETH D. KOCHANEK, JIAQUAN XU, SHERRY L MURPHY,
ARIALDI M. MININO & HSIANG-CHINGKUNG, NAT'L VITAL STAT.

SYS., DEATHS:

FOR 2009, at 1 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_03.pdf

FINAL DATA

[https://perm

a.cc/P6QD-EQVQ].
165. Estate Tax, supra note 84.
166. See SOI Tax Stats - Total Gifts of Donor, Total Gifts, Deductions, Credits, and Net

Gift Tax, IRS (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-total-gifts-of-donortotal-gifts-deductions-credits-and-net-gift-tax [https://perma.cc/Z6JG-M78R] (follow "2018"
hyperlink under "Statistical Tables"). For gifts made in the year 2018, significantly less than
0.0001% of the population filed a gift return in 2018. See 2018 National and State Population
Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/presskits/2018/pop-estimates-national-state.html [https://perma.cc/5X8B-XYRA] (follow "NSTEST2018-02: Table 2. Cumulative Estimates of Resident Population Change for the United
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exemption and decreased number of individuals who owe wealth transfer
taxes, one must ask whether there is any continued vitality to the concerns that
motivated Congress in 1981-namely, the likelihood that "innocent"
payments of items, such as educational and medical expenses, were subject to
the gift tax.1 67
4.

Modern Technology Can Assist in Taxpayer Compliance

Apart from increases in the wealth transfer tax exemption between 1981
and today, the concerns that motivated the enactment of I.R.C. § 2503(e) are
no longer relevant.1 68 With dramatic improvements in technology,1 69 there

should be no practical concern that the repeal of I.R.C.

§ 2503(e)(2)(A) would

result in taxpayers being unaware that tuition payments trigger a taxable gift

(to which they could apply their exemption). A university that receives a direct
payment of tuition from a grandparent, for example, could issue a form similar
States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico and Region and State Rankings: April 1, 2010 to July
1, 2018" hyperlink) (estimating an annual population of 327,167,434 in 2018); JIAQUAN XU,
SHERRY L. MURPHY, KENNETH D. KOCHANECK & ELIZABETH ARIAS, NAT'L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STAT., MORTALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2018, at 5 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/

nchs/data/databriefs/db355-h.pdf [https://penna.cc/C6TE-N2QF] (reporting 2,839,205 resident
deaths in the United States in 2018).
167. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, pt. IV, at 193 (1981). On the other hand, those numbers
indicate how much revenue could be produced by adopting a much lower and more equitable
exemption level that more accurately correlates with the current wealth of the top 10% of
taxpayers who make gifts or testamentary transfers. If Congress also repealed valuation
distortion techniques and made some other changes to the transfer tax system, that action would
go a long way to reduce our immensely high level of wealth disparities. See Joseph M. Dodge,
Three Whacks at Wealth Transfer Tax Reform: Retained-Interest Transfers, Generation-

Skipping Trusts, and FLP Valuation Discounts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2016); Gerzog,
supra note 155, at 1037.
168. H.R. REP. No. 97-201, pt. IV, at 193.
169. Compare Reuben Fischer-Baum, What 'Tech World' Did You Grow Up In?, WASH.
POST (Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/entertainment/techgenerations/ [https://penna.cc/LF77-2PJS] (reporting that 8% of all U.S. households had a
personal computer in 1984), with Table 702.60. Number and Percentage of Households with
Computer and Internet Access,

by

State:

2016,

NAT'L

CTR.

FOR EDUC.

STAT.,

https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_702.60.asp [https://perma.cc/9L9V-SNE
X] (estimating that 89.3% of all U.S. households had a computer in 2016). See also Nick
Routley, How the Computing Power in a Smartphone Compares to Supercomputers Past and
Present, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 6, 2017, 7:08 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/infographichow-computing-power-has-changed-over-time-2017-11
[https://perna.cc/49GR-6B2R]
(showing the one trillion-fold increase in computing power from 1956 to 2015 and noting that
the computer behind the first moon landing in 1969 had as much power as two Nintendo game
consoles); Patrick McCarthy, Infographic: The Growth of Computer Processing Power,
OFFGRID (May 2, 2017), https://www.offgridweb.com/preparation/infographic-the-growth-ofcomputer-processing-power/ [https://perma.cc/S89K-2XTP] (showing a pattern of computer
power doubling every two years from 1971-2011).
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to the Form 1099-Q that taxpayers receive in the year of distribution from a
529 plan or Coverdell education savings account.

170

Furthermore, tax

preparation programs, which are used by almost all professional tax preparers
and most individual filers (including via the IRS's Free File Program),171
could be modified to ask whether the taxpayer made any tuition payments on
behalf of an individual other than the taxpayer's minor child. If the taxpayer's
answer is affirmative, the program could generate a gift tax return in addition
to an income tax return. Alternately, the IRS could add a simple rider to the
Form 1040 that would allow taxpayers to file a gift tax return for tuition
payments along with their income tax return.
In states where parents are not required to pay their adult child's college
costs, a wrinkle could arise at the nexus of college tuition payments and
potential gift taxation. 172 In some of these states, a court can order one or both
divorced parents to subsidize or cover postsecondary education.17 3 Those
payments will not be subject to any gift tax.17 4 Any tax preparation program

can be easily programmed to take this information into account. In other
words, after repeal of I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A), improvements made to
technology in general and to tax-reporting technology in particular can

facilitate awareness and reports of direct tuition payments as taxable gifts.
170. See Form 1099-Q: Paymentsfrom Qualified Education Programs (Under Sections
529 and 530), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (rev. Nov. 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f1099q.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH4R-FS5C].
171. See Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX REV.
443, 456-57 (2014) (reporting that, in 2012, "nearly 100 percent" of paid preparers used tax
software and that 90% of all individuals used either a paid preparer or software). See generally
File Your Federal Taxes Online for Free, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/filing/free-file-do-yourfederal-taxes-for-free (Feb. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/CB3P-3WSD] (providing taxpayers a
method of filing their tax returns for free).
172. See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar, Incentivizing Parental Support for College Tuition
Through the Tax Code, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 827, 837 (explaining the "general rule that
parents are not required to pay for their students' college educations" but noting that some states
require divorced parents to pay for adult children's college costs).
173. Eg., IOWA CODE § 598.21(4) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.) (giving
courts the ability during divorce proceedings to set aside a portion of the marital property to
create a conservatorship or separate fund "for the support, maintenance, education, and general
welfare of the minor children"); Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1038-39 (N.J. 1982)
(listing twelve factors that a court should consider in deciding whether to order a parent to make
payments for higher education, including the financial resources of the parent and the aptitude
of the child for that education).
174. Harris v. Comm'r, 340 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1950) (holding that, when transfers under
a marital property settlement agreement are made by divorce court decree, those transfers are
not subject to gift tax). Professor Joseph Dodge has observed that "[t]he majority opinion in
Harris is difficult to fathom, but presumably it covers transfers mandated by law, other than
those that satisfy marital inheritance rights, even though not covered by a court decree." Joseph
M. Dodge, Are Gift Demand Loans of Tangible Property Subject to the Gift Tax?, 30 VA. TAX

REV. 181, 258 n.288 (2010).
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T AX BENEFITS AND RACIAL INEQUALITIES

The tax system both reflects and creates values. 7 5 As Professor Tsilly
Dagan has explained it:

[T]he currency of taxation necessarily sorts through attributes and
actions and measures and arranges them along the income tax
scale .

. .

. [T]his process of classifying, comparing, and measuring

has certain features that challenge and, at times, even reconstruct, the
reality it is intended to measure, thereby shaping our identities in a
number of ways. 176

In the context of tax benefits for higher education, the very existence of these
benefits makes at least two signals: first, that higher education in the United
States is expensive 77 and, second, that education is beneficial for individuals
and society. 7 8 There is a third possible perspective on the "currency" of taxfree tuition payments-one of the most generous of all educational tax
benefits. Because of the inferential evidence that these benefits inure to the
almost exclusive benefit of educated, white, wealthy individuals, another
message of I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A) is that the "deck is stacked" in favor of
maintaining those wealthy taxpayers' social welfare.
To be sure, if one understands the purpose of wealth transfer taxes, at least
in part as breaking up concentrations of wealth, 7 9 then one of the easiest ways
to accomplish that purpose is by dramatically lowering the exemption
amount.1 80 Repealing

I.R.C.

§ 2503(e)(2)(A) alone cannot eliminate or

drastically reduce wealth concentration in this country. A wider goal includes
enacting wealth transfer tax laws that do not systematically favor one race
over another in cases where a particular tax benefit contravenes the underlying
tax policy. As this Article has shown, one such case is the gift tax exemption
for direct tuition payments, where the overarching goal of wealth transfer
taxation is preventing tax-free, estate-depleting transfers.
175. Kitty Richards, An Expressive Theory of Tax, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 301,
303 (2017) (describing tax laws as an expression of a society's larger social values).
176. Tsilly Dagan, The Currency of Taxation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2537-38
(2016).
177. See supra Section II.A.
178. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
179. Eg.,Wendy C. Gerzog, The New Super-ChargedPAT (PowerofAppointment Trust),
48 Hous. L. REv. 507, 508 (2011) (noting that the wealth dilution goal of wealth transfer taxes
is "controversial"); James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825,
851 (2001) (identifying concerns about wealth concentration as one of the justifications for the
wealth transfer tax).
180. See supra Section IV.C.3 (discussing how the wealth transfer exemption allows
economic privilege to pass between generations).

2021 ]

TAX BENEFITS, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND RACE

81l3

The investigation of tax law through the lens of race is a foundational
move of critical tax scholarship.' 8 ' Although there is already a sizable body
of analysis at the intersection of race and taxation, 8 2 many areas of the tax
code merit further study. A non-exhaustive list includes familiar topics, such
as tax benefits related to homeownership, children, and dependents; the list
also includes capital gains, dividends and interest, retirement savings, the
income of rental real estate, pass-through businesses, charitable giving, and
health care. Analyzing how tax law impacts various taxpayers differently can
reveal the extent of the tax system's involvement in exacerbating inequalities
and sustaining privileges.

83

181. See CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 11, at 107 (describing
the "intersection of race and taxation" as the body of critical tax scholarship that directly
challenges "the myth of the 'neutrality' of the tax laws").
182. See, e.g., Alice G. Abreu, Tax Counts: BringingMoney-Law to LatCrit,78 DENV. U.
L. REV. 575 (2001); Bearer-Friend, supra note 20; David A. Brennen, Race andEqualityAcross
the Law School Curriculum: The Law of Tax Exemption, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336 (2014);
Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (2007);
Brown, MarriageBonus/Penalty,supra note 21; Brown, Tax Treatment of Children, supra note
21; Samuel D. Brunson & David J. Herzig, A DiachronicApproach to Bob Jones: Religious Tax
Exemptions After Obergefell, 92 IND. L.J. 1175 (2017); Francine J. Lipman, Nicholas A. Mirkay
& Palma Joy Strand, US. Tax Systems Need Anti-Racist Restructuring, 168 TAX NOTES FED.
855 (2020); Leo P. Martinez & Jennifer M. Martinez, The InternalRevenue Code andLatino
Realities:A CriticalPerspective, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 377 (2011); Moran & Whitford,
supra note 21; ANDRE L. SMITH, TAX LAW AND RACIAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE: BLACK TAX

(2015); Smith, supra note 80; Chloe Thompson, Commentary on United States v. Rickert, in
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS 55 (Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C.
Infanti eds., 2017); Mylinh Uy, Tax andRace: The Impact on Asian Americans, 11 ASIAN L.J.
117 (2004); Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, Commentary on Bob Jones University v. United States,
in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS, supra, at 140.
183. Eg., Aravind Boddupalli & Kim Rueben, Racial Disparities and the Income Tax
System, TAX POL'Y CTR. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://apps.urban.org/features/race-and-taxes/
[https://perma.cc/M8MF-Y89W] (using Form 1040 to examine "how the federal income tax
code interacts with existing racial inequities"). We acknowledge that race is one of many identity
axes. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. Other identity categories that are
particularly relevant for tax law analysis include gender, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, and
immigration status. No single identity category can fully account for the complex operation of
discrimination. See, e.g., Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory andAntiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 149 ("Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection,
coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may
flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it
can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of
them."); Kimberl Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991) ("I used the concept of
intersectionality .... to illustrate that many of the experiences Black women face are not
subsumed within the traditional boundaries of race or gender discrimination as these boundaries
are currently understood, and that the intersection of racism and sexism factors into Black
women's lives in ways that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender
dimensions of those experiences separately.").
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VI. CONCLUSION

The concept of colorblindness has a long, complex, and controversial
legal history. For some, the term "colorblind" expresses the idea that laws are
wrongful if they constrain individuals from attaining their full potential in

education, employment, or other aspects of social and political life on account
of their skin color.18 4 For others, the term "colorblind" means that laws are
wrongful if they permit affirmative action employment preferences for nonwhites.1 85 Still, others suggest that for the Supreme Court (and presumably
other courts) to be "colorblind," it must adopt an "ideological strategy by
which the current Court obscures its active role in sustaining hierarchies of
racial power."1 8 6 This is a corollary of Justice Blackmun's observation that
"[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race."1 8 7
Because Americans hold widely divergent views concerning the utility of
talking about race, conversations on these issues remain difficult.' 88 In the
case of tax policy, coming to some national consensus on what role race
should play in the law seems like an impossible goal.1 89
Professor Jeremy Bearer-Friend has critiqued the IRS's colorblind policy
as a "misguided tool" in the effort to prevent policy makers from
discriminating on the basis of race.1 90 He argues that "colorblind data conceal
racial inequalities embedded in our tax code and prevent the remedy of that
inequality" in an anti-democratic way.191 Bearer-Friend stops short of
recommending that the IRS collect race-based data, though, out of caution for

184. Eg., Brief for Appellants at *5, Anderson v. Martin, No. 51 (U.S. Aug. 26, 1963)
(arguing that the "Constitution is color blind" in challenging a Louisiana law that required
candidates for elective office to be identified by race on all ballots).
185. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (finding that
strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications, including those that provide financial
incentives for hiring federal contractors of certain races or ethnicities).
186. Kimberld Crenshaw et al., Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, xiii, xxviii (Kimberld Crenshaw et al. eds., 1996).
187. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. See, e.g., Tiffani G. Lee, Courageous Conversations About Race and Racism,

EXPERIENCE, Oct.-Nov. 2020, at 4, 4-5 (providing advice to others in the legal profession and
acknowledging that "[i]t will be difficult, if not impossible, to discuss issues of race and racism
in America if you're unwilling to be uncomfortable, so don't be afraid of uncomfortable
conversations").
189. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Examining the Internal Revenue Code for Disparate

Racial Impacts, 168 TAx NOTES FED. 1807, 1820 (2020) ("The government already collects
race-based data on virtually every other important activity of the federal government, and in any
event more knowledge is always a good thing. The harder question is what changes in the law,
if any, should follow when the data reveal racial disparities.").
190. Bearer-Friend, supra note 20, at 5-6.
191. Id. at 37-38.
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the agency's own reputation.1 92 We agree with his assessment that other tools,
including the U.S. Census's Current Population Survey and the Federal
Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances, could make minor modifications to
capture more accurate race-based tax information.1 93
For those who embrace a more racially just society, an important goal is
broadening the definition of "fairness" that applies in analyzing tax laws. In
the case of wealth transfer taxes, this Article argues that a particular tax benefit
is inequitable and, thus, should be repealed if (1) it has disparate impacts on
the basis of race and (2) its benefit is inconsistent with the overall policy
objective of taxing gratuitous transfers that create substantial wealth in the
transferee and deplete the transferor's estate. In the case of tax-free transfers
under I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A), both of those criteria are met: (1) it
disproportionately benefits educated, wealthy whites, and (2) it fails to tax
transfers that simultaneously generate a lifetime benefit for the donee and
diminish the size of the donor's gross estate.

192. See id. at 60-61.
193. Id. at 61.
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